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Abstract. While literary theory in general is not employed by historians to any great 
extent, cognitive narratology presents the historian with tools to appreciate texts 
more fully. With an emphasis on the mind, cognitive narratology focuses on the 
emotional side of history, as it were, and can elicit an understanding of the text 
which would otherwise and normally be overlooked. By examining language, and 
in particular, metaphors and deictics, in order to script the narrative, historical texts 
can as well produce cognitive clues about the author’s intent and mindset. For this 
first time, cognitive narratology is employed in the study of unpublished (archival) 
letters.
Keywords: cognitive narratology; modern european history; archival documents; 
naming; deictics.
By recognizing texts as historically-specific records of human minds 
in action, we can achieve new insights into both individual texts 
and the cultural milieus in which they exist. 
(Zunshine et al. 1998) 
Cognitive narratology, which combines the study of narrative and the mind, 
has till now played almost no role in refining the historian’s trade. Historians 
have generally looked askance at the tools employed by literary theorists, 
in part because it is believed that these applications are somehow convoluting 
the interpretive process or providing only sophistry in lieu of common sense 
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and critical reading (Kunsteiner 1993: 286; Carr 2008). Even narrative theory 
itself (minus the cognitive aspect), a common feature of both literature and 
history, has developed along parallel but separate paths (Fulda 2014). One-
time historian Hayden White’s foray into the structuralist-narrative discourse 
more than forty years ago bore this out as he attracted more support (and 
criticism) from literary critics than historians. He even subsequently 
transitioned into the literary field (Vann 1998). Historians largely rejected his 
relativist notions found in Metahistory (1973), which served to confirm their 
hunch about the dangers of literary theory’s application to history. English 
historian Lawrence Stone wrote passionately:
I agree in denouncing the appalling corruption of style in the writing 
of history by social science jargon and linguistic and grammatical 
obfuscation. I also agree that we should fight to preserve from 
the attacks by extreme relativists, from Hayden White to Derrida, 
the hard-won professional expertise in the study of evidence 
that was worked out in the late nineteenth century. (Kunsteiner 
1993: 286–7)
At issue for Stone and others was White’s belief that historians employ 
a trio of practices, deliberate or not (most often not), in developing their 
storyline. Behind every historical text are three essential elements: a type 
of emplotment or narrative technique; a type of argument or explanation; and 
a type of ideology or ethical position. The historian, White goes on to argue, 
cannot avoid these three phenomena, which occur during the process of taking 
a list of facts and converting them into the form of a story. The consequence 
of this is significant: historiography is infused with personal preferences and 
bias in order to fill in the narrative gaps. Thus, historiography is preceded 
or accompanied by metahistory: that which is concerned with the structure 
of historical narrative, which in White’s case constitutes semi-factualisms or 
outright fictionalizations. 
At the heart of White’s scepticism, where historical accuracy is concerned, 
is language. There exist four “distinct tropes of consciousness” which 
carry out historiographical exposition. They include metaphor, metonymy, 
synecdoche and irony1. These in turn reflect or “determine the secondary, 
 1 For more on White’s later ideas, in which he focuses more on narrativity and prob-
lems in literary criticism, see: Kunsteiner 1993: 284–85. For White’s latest intellectual de-
velopments, see: Domańska, Ewa (2008) “A conversation with Hayden White”, Rethinking 
History, 12:1, 3–21.
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conceptual level of the historian’s representational framework,” outlined 
in the previous paragraph (Kunsteiner 1993: 277–85).
If we look to the field of political philosophy, language has also been 
a focus, in this case, to outline improved ways to interpret political texts. 
Quentin Skinner in his now famous article “Meaning and Understand-
ing in the History of Ideas” places emphasis on language and its context 
(1969). And if we consider such political writings or speeches as historical 
acts and not merely ideas, then the discussion alongside White becomes 
more germane. Previously, the two main schools of thought within the field 
of political science claimed either that various empirical methods applied 
to texts could unlock their meaning without the need for historical con-
text, such as what New Criticism offered to the interpretation of a poem, 
or that speeches or writings were best understood through their histori-
cal contexts. What Skinner proposes, in addition to the historical context, 
is a linguistic context, or rather, a linguo-historical context, which he felt 
is crucial to the understanding of a writer’s intentions (Pocock 2008). 
In other words, writers “act in and upon” the language. Thus, in order 
to ensure the most accurate understanding of a given text, it is necessary 
to collect the full complement of possible meanings, based on what others 
said at the time. “The Other” – that is, the response or competing ideas (us-
ing similar language) made against the text under review – was necessary 
to consider in order to delimit the possible meanings for a given passage 
or word. Until the wider linguistic context is understood, Skinner argued, 
arriving at a correct interpretation is either elusive or only fortuitously con-
ceived (Hsiao).
And just as for White, so too the historian of political thought constructs 
historical narratives. For Skinner, narrative was paramount to his theory, 
in order to unlock truer meaning; for White, narrative was “imposed 
on a non-narrative world, distorting it and thus concealing rather than 
revealing it” (Carr 2008: 27). He was not concerned with understanding 
how storytelling could assist the historical interpretation, but with ascribing 
it literary features which inevitably placed a gap between it and the real 
world. For White, the construction of historical narratives was executed 
in a predetermined, semi-fictional manner; historians of political thought 
from the so-called “Cambridge School,” such as Skinner and J.G.A. Pocock, 
believed that narrative in fact helped to remove fiction from the story by 
observing changing “conditions” or “contexts” and processes surrounding 
the utterance of political statement (Pocock 2008: 165). 
In spite of the differences, both Skinner and White affirm the existence 
of “gaps” in the narrative, which cognitive narratology seeks to address 
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and narrow. In utilizing cognitive approaches, I am suggesting that there 
is an opportunity to address the problems which White determined were 
unable to be addressed in his textualist approach, and to complement 
Skinner’s theory of interpretation.
As its name suggests, cognitive narratology is derived from studies 
of the mind (psychology) and of narratives. On the narrative side, it owes 
its heritage to postclassical theories, which in turn draws from classical 
structuralists, such as R. Barthes, G. Genette, and T. Todorov (Herman 1999). 
White was influenced early on by Barthes. On the cognitive side, this science, 
formerly a separate endeavour in psychology, began to be applied to literary 
narrative in the 1990s (Duchan et. al. 1995). This became what is known 
as the “cognitive turn”. The mind was now considered “a core property 
of narrativity,” and experience or “subjective awareness” became an object 
of interpretation (Herman 2013) or at times, speculation. In terms of language, 
textual signals within the “narrative discourse” which acts as prompts for 
cognitive-based analysis, were examined by Ryan (1991) and Werth (1999). 
And M. Turner (1996) began discussing metaphors as a cognitive-linguistic 
model to understand the human mind through “parabolic projections” and 
the “mapping of source stories onto target stories.”
What this article proposes is to identify cognitive clues within 
archival documents and use these (clues) to project greater meaning onto 
the historical frame, already resident in the historian’s mind. In other words, 
I am suggesting that instead of placing cognitive clues strictly (and only) into 
a narrative frame or script in order to produce understanding, the historian 
is in a unique position to overlay another – historical – frame or script based 
on his or her historical expertise. By framing I mean a story within a story; 
while scripting “generate[s] expectations about how sequences of events 
are supposed to unfold” (Herman 2013). By its very definition, scripts are 
more applicable to cognitive aspects of narrative than framing (Olson and 
Fludernik 2011)2. And concerning the historian, the greater the degree 
of knowledge one possesses in one’s field of study, the clearer and more 
refined these historical frames and scripts will be, and the more meaning and 
insight can be drawn from the material under examination, which in this case 
are archival letters. 
 2 On the limits of framing, see Sternberg, Meir (2003). “Universals of Narrative and 
Their Cognitivist Fortunes (I).” Poetics Today 24, 297–395. Jan Alber and Monika Fludernik 
discuss the division between ‘frame-abiding” and “frame-shattering” – in the postclassical era 
of narratology.
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Applying cognitive narratology to letter writing is appropriate for 
several reasons. Personal letters are by their very nature emotional, and thus 
represent an important, but neglected area of study. And in terms of framing 
the size of letters written in Europe in the early 19th century approximate 
dimensions of a picture frame (see Photo 1.)3. Thus, the letters conform both 
physically and instrumentally to the notion of framing. Each successive letter 
mirrors the “frame by frame” approach of narratologists. And gaps in these 
episodic or interrupted narratives are observable.
Despite encompassing a large and diverse “narrative corpora,” including 
transmedia forms of analysis, cognitive narratology has not included the sort 
of non-fictional examples that this paper proposes to examine, that is archival 
correspondence. Personal letters comprise, in nearly all cases, micro-stories 
which somehow intersect with the author’s life. In this manner, personal 
letters meet the minimum criteria established by experts in cognitive 
narratology, since they contain “at least some degree of narrativity” (Herman 
2013; Fludernik 1996).
And while cognitive narratology has not been employed by historians, 
Natalia Zemon Davis’ celebrated work, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales 
and Their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century France does employ narratology 
(1987). This historian of early modern France uses sixteenth-century pardon 
tales located in French archives “to examine the storytelling arts of ordinary 
people” (Halttunen 1999: 169). Davis is handicapped somewhat by 
the uncertainty of authorship (whether legal scribes or the petitioner) as well 
as the lack of biographical information of each of the petitioners of these 
plea narratives, obstacles that this present work does not have. Alberto 
Bellenghi (1757-1839), the author of the letters which this article will study, 
possessed a (minor) noble background from the province of Forli-Cesena 
in the region of Emilia-Romagna in central Italy (Pignatelli 1970). He joined 
the Camaldolese order, a branch of the Benedictines, in 1773. Monks who 
entered the profession before the turn of the 19th century, as Bellenghi did, 
were often socially privileged and well educated, as Bellenghi was. He 
published two books each in the fields of archeology and canon law during 
the 1780s and 1790s. The recipient of Bellenghi’s correspondence was 
nobleman Count Girolamo Possenti. How they first met is unclear, but they 
were intimately acquainted; Bellenghi often sent greetings to or enquired 
into members of Possenti’s immediate family. Thus, the contribution here 
is not as it is in Davis’ case, to give voice to lower social castes (and a few 
 3 Berlatsky (2009) rejects the picture frame metaphor in favor of the comic book lay-
out instead.
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women), but to suggest research in a new genre, personal letters, digitally or 
traditionally archived. In European repositories alone, the number of such 




Photo 1.  Letter from A. Bellenghi to G. Possenti, 17 Nov. 1814. State Archives 
of Rome
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Personal letters are different in still other ways to Davis’ pardon tales. 
Concerning the latter, the story is “complete” in that it is composed with 
a beginning, a middle and an end. And their purpose is understood: to induce 
mercy from the king. Personal letters, on the other hand, are written for 
a different purpose – to convey the happenings in one’s life or to report 
on affairs of mutual interest, between writer and receiver. In terms of narrative, 
each letter is comprised most often of a series of incomplete micro-plots or 
stories. They have large gaps in terms of both information and time, especially 
given the pace of travel and transport in the early 19th century; as well, these 
epistolary narratives do not always contain proper character development nor 
introductions and denouements. In the story narrated by Bellenghi, which 
deals with a property dispute, he begins rather suddenly, with no introduction 
of the main antagonist. Such gaps in the narrative provide special challenges 
for the historian; they also, I believe, provide opportunities and a rationale 
for the use of literary and cognitive theories.
This present study stands out within the field of cognitive narratology 
in two important ways that the reader must bear in mind throughout. 
First, as mentioned, this epistolary genre represents a specific “medium,” 
to borrow David Herman’s terminology, which has hitherto been 
unexamined. The second difference deals with the objective of this inquiry. 
While both the historian and the literary theorist endeavour to interpret and 
understand whatever it is that they are examining, the goal at the lower 
levels is different. The late, renowned legal philosopher and theorist, Ronald 
Dworkin, made a compelling attempt to reconcile contrasting interpretations 
of a particular text or painting or whatever else two people can disagree 
about when forming an interpretation. A literary or legal interpreter, he 
argued, adopted an approach known as “collaborative interpretation”. That 
is to say, the interpreter forms a “partnership” with the creator of the work. 
For the legal interpreter, she collaborates with Thomas Jefferson when 
analyzing the Declaration of Independence; for the literary interpreter, he 
works in tandem, as it were, with Lord Byron to form meaning. By contrast, 
the historian is primarily interested in an explanatory interpretation. Dworkin 
continues: “[The historian studies] the meaning of the events or data and 
take[s] what they deem to be important and important for their audience.” 
This helps explain why Hayden White was so roundly criticized by historians 
of nearly every ilk; for his ideas contravened one of the historian’s core values, 
effectively saying in Metahistory that “valid historical explanation is dead.” 
Incidentally, this quotation, purloined and adapted from Nietzsche, was not 
so far removed from what the great German philosopher and philologist 
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himself believed. The nature of language becomes debased over time, and 
truth becomes a rather empty collection of figures of speech. 
Thus, I intend to use the theoretical applications and in particular these 
cognitive and narrative findings in order to explain more fully what happened. 
Hence, this article will examine one story in the Bellenghi correspondence 
and analyze it structurally and linguistically in order to find cognitive 
clues. I will look at the story’s various frames and (internal) contexts and 
the significances of their merging with and separating from other stories 
within each letter. What is more, I will look at instances of shifts in naming 
and deictics. In all three cases, the goal is to gain insights into Bellenghi’s 
mind; for he is both author and protagonist in the story. 
The story in question is derived from a cache of a 100 or so letters from 
Bellenghi to Possenti housed at the State Archives of Rome. They cover 
nearly 19 years of friendship, from 1799 to 1818. Individually, the letters 
contain numerous micro-narratives. I have decided to focus on one particular 
story that took place between 1814 and 1815 and is found in 15 of these 
letters. The setting is Rome; the period is known as the Restoration (1814-30), 
which followed the (first) defeat of Napoleon in the spring of 1814. As was 
generally the case, the property of religious orders had been sold or otherwise 
confiscated following the military conquests of Napoleonic France. This was 
especially so in Italy. Monasteries and non-diocesan properties were easy 
targets for pillage by the French and their local collaborators. The residence 
and property which Procurator General Bellenghi and others in leadership for 
his order occupied in Rome (i.e. S. Romualdo) was sold in 1812 to a private 
(wealthy) citizen of Rome, Francesco Palombi. The fate of property was, 
in fact, the most controversial aspect of the Restoration. Bellenghi’s story, 
thus, represents a much wider problem occurring at the time. The story which 
will be examined here discusses Bellenghi’s struggle to reobtain the building 
from its new owner (Palombi). 
The Palombi affair is positioned within each letter alongside other micro-
narratives, some larger, some smaller, some related, some not; and the letter 
itself, and its collection of stories, in turn is framed within the context 
of Bellenghi’s life. (I will not be taking into consideration the paratext 
of the letter, i.e. the address page, the headings and salutations, which 
Genette made so much of; Berlatsky 2009). The degree to which the larger 
history or backdrop is known is dependent upon the historian’s knowledge 
of the individual and their circumstances (Sitz im Leben), as well as the amount 
of the extant material. This represents a sort of merging of horizons between 
the background of the reader and those of the text/author in what H.G. Gadamer 
spoke of in his famous theory Horizontverschmelzung. Herman simplifies 
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Gadamer’s model in explaining the presence of these so-called “gaps” in the 
story: “The dynamics and interpretation of narratives depend on the absence 
of information and on discrepancies between the reader’s knowledge and 
the knowledge possessed by narrators and characters. As narrative theory 
teaches us, narratives come into being through the interaction between minds 
and narrative gaps” (Bernaerts, et al. 2013: 3).
In each of the fifteen letters written between October 1814 and May 
1815, the physical placement or location of the Palombi story differs. 
Firstly, in none of the letters is the story ever the lead, that is, the first 
story discussed after the heading. Instead, stories and issues that directly 
involve both Possenti and Bellenghi are related first; and they nearly always 
involve money, or the lack thereof in the case of Bellenghi. Thus, in terms 
of collective interest between Possenti and Bellenghi, the Palombi story 
is less important. But in terms of Bellenghi’s own life, the story is often 
the first story discussed that does not directly involve Possenti. So critical 
is the story to Bellenghi that at one point he even tries to involve Possenti 
in the Palombi dispute by asking for his help in finding alternative housing, 
should Bellenghi be forced to leave the residence (letter #12). 
It comes as no surprise that Bellenghi would be concerned with 
securing stable housing. Yet this fear or concern varies during the eight 
months of the affair and can be observed by how Bellenghi structures his 
letter. In nearly half of the missives to Possenti which deal with the topic, 
i.e. 6 of 15, Bellenghi gives the affair its own paragraph, suggesting a great 
preoccupation with it. There were three occasions when Bellenghi merges 
a story within the Palombi affair. This, to my mind, signifies the affair’s 
overshadowing presence in relation to other events taking place in Bellenghi’s 
life. What is revealing here are the other issues that Bellenghi associates 
with the Palombi story. One can even suggest that, to Bellenghi’s mind, 
there must be causal relationships to events that he places within the same 
paragraph, when leading with the Palombi story. In one letter he mentions 
his pecuniary status, rhetorically asking Possenti how it will be possible 
for the monks to live on 400 lire (letter #5); and while the temporary loss 
of their residence did not directly contribute to their poverty, it represented 
instability in key areas of his life. The Church set a fixed yearly allowance 
for the monks, which Bellenghi considered insufficient and as unsettling 
as the Palombi affair. On another occasion, he fuses the problems related 
to the order’s flagship monastery, S. Gregorio, just a 10 minute walk from 
S. Romualdo, to the troubles with Palombi (letter #6). In both cases Bellenghi 
illuminates the larger, background issues which were playing out during 
the Restoration. Religious clerics, i.e. monks and nuns, lacked the resources 
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not only to prepare their former monasteries for re-entry, but in many cases, 
merely to provide for themselves.
What is also interesting in terms of story placement are the occasions 
when the Palombi narrative is located within an existing paragraph or story, 
as was the case in nearly half of the letters (6 of 15). At such times, it seems 
that the affair is less of a concern for Bellenghi. For example in his letter 
from 15 November 1814, he begins the second of three paragraphs reporting 
on payments received and those which will be made. This is followed by 
a matter of fact statement that he and the other monks are planning to move 
back into S. Romualdo “within the week” (letter #4). The statement is reported 
with no emotive language. On this occasion he held a more positive and 
confident attitude regarding the outcome of the Palombi affair. More 
often – on at least four of the seven occasions – the Palombi story is woven 
into the larger narrative of the Restoration. For Bellenghi it seems then, 
in contrast to the above paragraph when the concerns of the Restoration were 
of secondary importance to his ability to find a permanent accommodation, 
on these occasions, the more general concerns of the Restoration and his 
order overshadowed his own individual concerns: “Here [in Rome] affairs 
go very badly and nothing is concluded. All superiors of monastic orders 
believe that they must return [to their original monastic residences], just 
as they came” (letter #3). On such occasions he draws solace from knowing 
that he is not alone in these struggles for survival, as he views it. But in fact 
many others are feeling similarly. This communal attitude which Bellenghi 
describes is a common coping mechanism among those who are feeling 
persecuted or targeted in some way.
Turning to the analysis of naming and renaming within a narrative, 
much can be gleaned cognitively, informing the reader of Bellenghi’s 
state of mind and his changes in attitude. In our story, which is carried 
along through fifteen letters, Bellenghi refers to Palombi in four different 
ways: Palombi, Mr [Signore] Palombi, buyer [Compratore] Palombi, and 
simply acquirer or purchaser [acquirente]. In Bellenghi’s first letter which 
discusses the story, he refers to the antagonist as simply “Palombi,” a referent 
as opposed to a description4. Palombi’s sudden entry, without a first name or 
a description, suggests that Possenti was familiar with him. In what context 
that might have been is unknown. But it is very possible that the two friends 
had discussed the situation in person some time between Palombi’s purchase 
of S. Romualdo in 1812 and Bellenghi’s return to Rome in the middle 
 4 For the use of referents in the theory of naming, see R. Ronen (1994). Possible 
Worlds in Literary Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 131.
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of 1814. Palombi is referred to by name in the first nine letters, in the form 
of “Palombi” (six times), “Mr Palombi” (twice) or “Buyer Palombi” (once). 
In two of the early letters, from October 1814, he refers to him as “Sig.r 
Palombi” or Mr Palombi, which from the context would seem to denote 
a more official and respectful disposition on the part of Bellenghi (letters 
#2/#3). However, in subsequent correspondence detailing the problems 
that Palombi is causing, Bellenghi drops the “Mr” in front of his name. 
He attributes damage of the residence to Palombi: “But Palombi has done 
much damage to the walls, doors, and windows, out of spite” (letter #5). 
Additionally, Bellenghi hears of rumours that Palombi will seek financial 
reimbursement from the order for the capital improvements made on the 
building (letter #4). In terms of the renaming which occurs in the story, 
John Frow believes such instances “[signal] a change of social status” (Frow 
2014: 185). Whether or not this change by Bellenghi is social in nature, 
it certainly represents a more negative attitude toward Palombi5.
There is a separate context involving Bellenghi which correlates with 
his use of referents and his fluctuation of attitude. In a letter dated 8 February 
1815, in which he transitions from using “Palombi” to simply “buyer” 
[acquirente], Bellenghi also expresses his desire to leave Rome, and thus, 
remove himself from the story: “I am determined to leave Rome” [sono fisso 
di partire da Roma] (letter #10). Associating these two concomitant facts (the 
change in reference and the desire to quit Rome), the dispirited Bellenghi 
seems to be reflecting a desire to detach himself from the problems caused 
by Palombi – a sort of psychological protective mechanism. Even more 
revealing and symbolic of his capitulation is his refusal to refer to Palombi by 
name in the final six letters of the story; feelings of ill-will and associations 
with a troubled existence seem to account for the change. 
But beyond any cognitive insights – what Nesselroth (1996) might refer 
to as a change in attitude – there is as well a descriptive element to calling 
Palombi simply “acquirer.” In doing so, Bellenghi is acknowledging that 
Palombi purchased the property in a legal sort of way. If not, Bellenghi 
could have referred to him using any number of less respectful appellations. 
This concession conforms as well, to his actions of retreating – from Rome 
(physically) and from the fight (emotionally). Why challenge for the rights 
to a residence someone else owns?
 5 On the relationship of names and experiences or attitudes, see P. R. Nesselroth, 
(1996). Naming Names in Telling Tales. In C. A. Mihailescu and W. Hamarneh (Eds.) Fiction 
Updated: Theories of Fictionality, Narratology, and Poetics. Toronto–Buffalo: University 
of Toronto Press, 133.
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The evolution of Bellenghi’s attitude to a more defeatist one is revealed 
in the text in still other ways. His use of personal pronouns reveals a sort 
of deictic shift which takes place as the narrative progresses. Deictic shifting 
is traditionally understood through the changes of who, where and when, 
that is the pronoun “I” or “he,” “here” or “there,” or “coming” and “going” 
(Duchan et. al. 1995). I will consider forms of deictic shifts dealing with 
whom and where – Bellenghi’s position of himself or “I” within the story and 
the physical referent of where (i.e. the order’s former house [casa]). 
In the early letters, Bellenghi refers to the battle (or “war”) with Palombi 
over control of the building as his own, often using the first person pronoun 
“I” [io]. On 3 October 1814, he writes: “you cannot comprehend the war 
that I must sustain with Palombi, who has powerful protectors” (letter #1). 
In the following letter he again positions himself in the centre of the story: 
“I hope of going to live in the house of Mr Palombi” (letter #2). His optimism 
or “hope” early on is based on the reports that he had been given concerning 
the order’s imminent return to the residence. As events begin unfolding 
unpredictably, the focus of the story begins to shift slightly. Bellenghi begins 
to omit himself from the story – or at least, he narrates as part of a group 
of monks, not desiring to stand alone on the parapet, as it were. He still 
has hope, in a letter the following week, but it is less pronounced. “I have 
hope” is mentioned at the end of the three-line entry, not at the beginning. 
Instead he begins by using the communal first person plural possessive 
“our” without reference to himself: “Our affairs go very badly, and nothing 
is concluded” (letter #3). He contextualizes this affair within the larger 
Restoration taking place, which I noted earlier, in an effort to align himself 
with others undergoing similar hardships.
What is also interesting to note is that, as the affair takes an unexpected turn 
and a final decision on the fate of the residence is further delayed, Bellenghi 
begins to invoke (or at least mention) “God.” And in the sense of narrative, 
he creates a new character to replace himself within the story, as if to suggest 
that his efforts failed and someone more capable is needed. After one former 
monk returned to take up his former profession, following a long period 
of forced secularization, Bellenghi exclaims idiomatically: “Let’s hope that 
he [Torelli] won’t lose it all” [Dio voglia che non s’abbia a spogliare] (letter 
#3). Dio, Italian for “God,” is used idiomatically here, but within in the context 
of the Restoration and within the same paragraph as the Palombi affair. 
Perhaps the idea here is more compelling if the story is looked at differently. 
Bellenghi never invoked “God” in the narrative when the outcome appeared 
at hand or at least predictable. So whereas his “hope” from a week earlier 
lay in his understanding of how events would favorably unfold, a week later, 
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he invoked the “support” of his colleagues, who themselves were in similar 
situations, as well as God, as a basis of his “great hope” [molto speranza] 
(letter #3).
By the end of 1814, Bellenghi shifted the responsibility of the outcome, 
i.e. his fate, solely onto “God.” Four months in the affair it was no longer 
his “war:” “The Holy Father has remitted the supplication to the Cardinal. 
May God bring us good [results] and not leave us homeless another time” 
(letter #8). And again in March 1815, Bellenghi is no longer a key part 
of the narrative, or if so, only in a passive manner: “The affairs of the house 
are still prolonged, and I see that it will be delayed further until the owner 
comes to take possession of it again. May God’s will be done” (letter 
#11). Bellenghi’s reaction and reliance upon divine intervention was not 
uncommon at this time, especially when situations appeared hopeless or dire. 
During the impending French invasion of Rome in 1796, it was clear that 
the undermanned and undertrained papal guards would be no obstacle for 
the French. At once there appeared in various cities of the Papal Legations, 
instances of a “moving-eyed Mary,” which locals, clerics and lay, interpreted 
as God’s promise for divine intervention and protection6.
Finally, Bellenghi’s nomenclature when referring to the residence 
in question, provide cognitive clues into Bellenghi’s thinking. His use 
of “house” [casa] in its various forms project certain attitudes and 
assumptions. When Bellenghi initially arrives to Rome the spring of 1814 
to find the building with a new owner, he refers to it as “the house 
of Mr Palombi” (letters #2/#3). A week later, when he thought that he and his 
colleagues would be moving back in, he referred to the building, revealingly, 
as “the house of S. Romualdo” (letter #5). S. Romualdo was the founder 
of the Camaldolese order to which Bellenghi belonged and was the name 
assigned to this house prior to Palombi’s purchase of it. In this letter Palombi 
is mentioned separately, no longer identified as the owner of the house, 
but now as simply an actor in the narrative. With his presumed imminent 
return, Bellenghi wrote, “Within a week I will be in S. Romualdo” (letter 
#4). The sole use of “S. Romualdo” to identify his house served to link ever 
more closely in Bellenghi’s mind his right to inhabit the building. However, 
as matters become complicated, Bellenghi refers to the building as simply 
 6 For more, see: M. Cattaneo (2000). L’Invidia Appagata: de’ prodigi avvenuti in mol-
te sagre immagini specialmente di Maria Santissima in Rome. In Roma negli anni di influenza 
e dominio francese. Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 133–58, and (1995). Maria ver-
sus Marianne. I “miracoli” del 1796 ad Ancona. In Cristianesimo nella storia. 16, 1: 45–77; 
L. Fiorani (1992). Città religiosa e città rivoluzionaria. In Ricerche per la Storia Religiosa di 
Roma. 9: 110-118. 
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“casa” with no attachment either to Palombi or to his order. This choice 
of wording occurs in the four middle letters (letters #8-11). And then as fear 
grips him, he adopts a more formal approach in ascribing the residence 
to Palombi: “One fears that the buyer of the house will return in a few days” 
(letter #12). 
In his final four letters about the affair, between 25 March and 24 May 1815, 
Bellenghi avoids reference not only to Palombi but as well the house (except 
for one reference in the final letter). The story instead focuses on Bellenghi’s 
unfortunate situation, but in such an oblique manner that he seems to confirm 
Barthes’s idea that the writing obstructs the origin of meaning and the subject 
somehow slips away (Barthes 1970). There is no reference point in physical 
or personal terms (letter #13). The narrative becomes almost unintelligible, 
subsumed by the emotional stress of uncertainty. Or when there is a focal 
point of sorts, it centers around the act of being removed: “the alienation 
affair” (L’affare dell’alienazione) (letter #14). In the final letter of the story, 
the deictic shift is complete: “The house has been rented… and it costs us 
5.50 lire. The petition for us has still not been decided... . Meanwhile we are 
here” (letter #15). The story concludes but one gets the feeling that there 
is no closure for Bellenghi. The feeling of uncertainty looms – as Bellenghi 
never writes “our house.” In fact he does not associate the building with 
either party, reflecting perhaps as well the divided nature of the building 
itself – with Palombi occupying part, the monks, part. Nonetheless, there 
is what can be referred to as a deictic conclusion to the story – “Meanwhile, 
we are here.” The reader understands where “here” is and which “house” 
is being referred to. They are the same. But not in the mind of Bellenghi, 
who throughout his narration altered his understanding of casa based on the 
ebbs and flows of the narrative, which, unlike fictional accounts, he was 
never in control of despite being its author. His abrupt conclusion leaves 
the reader with a feeling of incompleteness through the use of “meanwhile;” 
in a similar way, I believe, this is how Bellenghi himself felt. 
As alluded to at the outset, historians may bridle at the notion of the use 
of such theories as cognitive narratology which necessitates at times the use 
of “perhaps,” “might/maybe” or “seems.” These words of uncertainty, 
purists would argue, are better left out of the historical record until more 
proof is found. Philosopher of history David Carr (2008) argues persuasively 
about the need to exercise caution when applying “rigid formal [cognitive] 
structures” to texts, for he believes that they might “well restrict meaning 
and interpretation.” Carr’s fear is understandable: scholars should not 
abandon their common sense formed through scientific inquiry and 
mindlessly conform to “a certain worldview” or theory. In the process he 
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expresses scepticism about the efficacies of cognitive science on narrative 
interpretation. He believes that cognitive narratology will eventually give 
way to other newer fads or theories, rendering it, in effect, obsolete. Not 
coincidentally, Carr had critical words for Hayden White’s theories as well, 
one of which was mentioned at the outset of this article. And on this 
point, Carr unwittingly justifies the need for such a study. He believes that 
the narrative structure is not “arbitrarily imposed on the events of the past, 
but inherent in them. For Carr, our narratives reflect a fundamental property 
of human consciousness; they are part of the fabric of human life.” (Halttunen 
1999: 170–71) Cognitive narratology is also concerned with the human 
consciousness. 
The future of cognitive narratology, however, is not my concern 
presently. More critically is whether or not the questions related to theories 
such as cognitive narratology lead us closer to “truth.” In this sense, the use 
of cognitive narratology is, I believe, justified because literary theorists ask 
more questions about the author and the text. And more questions inevitably 
lead to better questions. In this article I asked a series of cognitive-leading 
questions, in relation to Bellenghi’s uses of several referents, including 
himself, as “I”, and the residence. As well questions related to the evolution 
of Bellenghi’s language over the eight months during which these letters were 
written – from “hope” to “God” – is suggestive of his views and feelings. 
My initial examination of these letters, as part of my doctoral dissertation 
of 2006, led to a general understanding of the event. I understood that Bellenghi 
and his order struggled to gain re-entry into the house, but lost on me at 
the time were the psychological aspects of the struggle. And these aspects can 
in turn inform the historian about the historical setting. In addition, the very 
notion of time – such a crucial element of narrative and historiography – was 
less appreciated in 2006 than in 2016. The ups and downs, the high points 
and low points, are particularly felt during a cognitive analysis of language, 
referentiality and reader reception. As a result, the duration of the Palombi 
affair lengthened, as if were. I also have a greater sense of Bellenghi’s 
perspective, his state of mind and the uncertainty of these times, which 
are revealed through his language. Just as for White and Skinner, language 
in our case, reveals cognitive qualities of the author which in turn unlock 
more meaning of the event. 
Bellenghi’s projection of events onto the larger canvas of the Restoration, 
which are revealed in the structure of his letters, provides justification for 
the historian to do the same. Contrary to what its name suggests, the Restoration 
was a period of forlorn hopes and great uncertainty. Bellenghi’s fears related 
to money and housing and career were experienced by all of those men and 
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women who desired to return (many did not) to their former professions 
following the defeat of Napoleon. That Bellenghi desired to give up the fight 
so quickly not only reveals a personal characteristic of his, but as well 
an insight into a rather privileged and uncontested past which certain monks 
had previously enjoyed. 
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